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Introduction 
“Conspirators be they that…bind themselves by Oath…or other Alliance, that every of them 
shall aid and support the Enterprise of each other falsely and maliciously to indite.”1 
Established in the Third Ordinance of Conspirators in 1304; the first definition of conspiracy 
was to prevent and punish those who would plan to use children to present their false 
accusations in court on their behalf (as children could not be criminally liable). The aim of the 
law on conspiracy, although widening the scope, has been clear from the thirteenth century: to 
prevent and punish the planning of a criminal offence. However, since expanding, the law on 
conspiracy has been criticised especially in regard to sentencing as “unduly harsh.”2 This is the 
result of numerous problems with the current law on conspiracy to murder, which is in urgent 
need of reform. “On the 10th of October 2007, the law commission proposed many 
recommendations on reforms of statutory conspiracy.”3 The focus of this legal research is to 
explore the current state of law regarding conspiracy to murder and the legislation, case law, 
scholarly and media articles discussed in this report will evaluate the effectiveness and fairness 
of the law on conspiracy to murder. Thus, the question to sum up our legal research “Is the 
current law on conspiracy to commit murder effective and fair? 
Current law on Conspiracy to Murder 
“Conspiracy” derives from the Latin words “con” and “spirare” meaning “to breathe together”4 
and can be defined as an act where two or more people have agreed to commit a crime5, but is 
also defined within the Criminal Law Act 1977.6 Murder can be defined as “the unlawful 
killing of another human being, under the Queen’s peace, with malice aforethought.”7 
Combining these two offences creates the offence of conspiracy to murder which essentially is 
an agreement to commit the unlawful killing of another human being. It is an offence for any 
                                                     
1 JF Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 2 228-229 
See also: CR Snyman, 'The History And Rationale Of Criminal Conspiracy' (1984) 17 The Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa. 
2 Dr Michael Arnheim, ‘A conspiracy too far?’ (2018) 168 The New Law Journal  
3  Law Commission, 'Conspiracy And Attempts | Law Commission' (2018)  
4 Paul Jarvis and Michael Bisgrove, 'The Use And Abuse Of Conspiracy' (2014) 4 Criminal Law Review. 
5 Jacqueline Martin and Tony Storey, Unlocking Criminal Law (6th edn Routledge) chapter 6.3 
6 Criminal Law Act 1977, S.1 
7 Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England (1797) 
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party to conspire to murder.8 There are some exceptions as to who can commit conspiracy as 
a person cannot be convicted if the only other party is an intended victim, spouse, or child 
under the age of criminal responsibility (10 years old)9. 
In Khalil10 the appellants were charged with conspiring to murder Qayum, the victim. An 
undercover police officer disguised as “Mick” acted as a hitman, Hussain went to Mick in order 
to have Qayum murdered for having an affair with his daughter.  LJ Tuskey clarified that it is 
a criminal offence for two or more persons to agree with one another to commit an offence and 
that the actual conspiracy is the agreement made between those parties. However, the 
judgement gives no definition of what an “agreement” is. It has been left to courts to define 
this term. This could be to allow flexibility in the law, however the understood definition is 
that “agreement” is where “the parties to it have a common unlawful purpose or design.”11 
Khalil also confirmed; it does not matter where a conspirator’s involvement appears on the 
scale of seriousness or precisely where they became involved, they are still guilty. This is a 
clear example of how harsh convictions can be in conspiracy cases especially in this case for 
Nazar, who dropped out before the crime had been carried out, yet still faced conviction.12  
The sentencing of conspiracy to murder has always carried a maximum sentence of 
imprisonment for life13 and this remains in the new legislation.14 However, judges are allowed 
to decide if life imprisonment is necessary. There is a code of sentencing that judges use and 
examples of this are Raw15 and Daddow16. The court concluded that a sentence of eighteen 
years for conspiracy to murder is not excessive, since murder was carried out. It is important 
to note that, murder itself is not a requirement for the offence of conspiracy to murder however 
is an aggravating factor.  
                                                     
8 Criminal Law Act 1977 S 1(1) 
9 Criminal Law Act 1977 S 2 
10 R v Khalil and Others [2003] EWCA Crim 3467 
11 R v Mehta (Subhash) [2012] EWCA Crim 2824 
12 Khalil (n 10) 
13 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 c 100 (Regnal 24 and 25 Vict) S 4 
14 Criminal Law Act 1977 S 3(2)(a) 
15 R v Raw (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 229 
16 R v Daddow [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 10 
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Problems with the Current law: 
Philosophical aspects of Sentencing 
There are two types of criminal law theories on punishment: Immanuel Kant’s retribution view 
and Jeremy Bentham’s consequentialism view. From the perspective of Kant, a criminal must 
deserve punishment; “thus, one must deserve punishment in order to be punished 
justifiably…”17 Conversely, the perspective of Bentham, “all punishment is evil” unless “it 
promises to exclude some greater evil.”18 A life sentence will deter the criminal to commit the 
crime again. Therefore, deserving to be punished is “neither necessary nor sufficient for 
punishment.”19 In Kant’s view, punishment will still be insisted even though there is no 
positive outcome but “the importance of desert to the justification of punishment is hard to 
deny.”20 In a modern working society, it can seem slightly pointless imprisoning someone. If 
there is no positive effect on society, or the prisoner then, it would be a waste of financial 
resources. 
In contrast, Bentham acknowledges the fact that punishment must be counter-balanced by some 
greater social good.21 This balance is important to maintain fairness in the criminal law as 
although society need protecting, criminals still have rights and need to be punished 
deservingly; not just to keep them away from society. Without a doubt, Parliament should 
consider these legal theories when reforming the sentencing procedure in criminal offences, 
especially in offences for conspiring to murder. 
McNee22 which posed the question “are discretionary life sentence appropriate”23 in conspiracy 
to murder cases? The appellants: McNee, Gunn and Russell were convicted for conspiracy to 
murder and were “sentenced to life imprisonment, with minimum terms fixed at 25 years, 35 
                                                     
17 ‘IX. CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: PUNISHMENT’ Aileen Kavanagh and John Oberdiek, ’Arguing About 
Law‘ (Taylor and Francis 2013)  469 
18 Bentham as cited by Aileen Kavanagh and John Oberdiek, Arguing About Law (Taylor and Francis 2013) 469 
19 Kavanagh and Oberdiek, (n 17)  469-470 
20 ibid  470 
21 ibid  470 
22 R v McNee [2007] EWCA Crim 1529; [2008] 1 Cr App R (S) 24  
23 ibid [H1] 
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years and 30 years respectively.”24 In their appeal, the appellants stated, accepting it is the 
maximum penalty, their imposition of a discretionary life sentence was wrong in principle. It 
is important to note that as the offence was committed in August 2004 and life sentences for 
second list offences could only be imposed if the offence was committed after the section came 
into force.25 Therefore, it was submitted that s224A(1)(b) was inappropriate unless there was 
‘some imponderable feature which would make it impossible to forecast the future if the 
offender were ever were to be released.”26 Judges stated that Gunn would still “pose a serious 
danger to the public.” This was valid reason to protect the public in the future following 
Bentham’s theory to “punish evil.”27  
Furthermore, “McNee had never been convicted of any offence of violence in his past…(but)… 
He still was a vital member of the conspiracy, fully in the know, and giving essential help right 
up to the very point of the shooting.”28 In this case, there would be “uncertainty, 
unpredictability, instability”29 of the future if a discretionary life sentence was not imposed. 
The appellants clearly committed a grave offence; therefore, it was accepted to impose the 
sentence as there was a greater need to protect the public. 
Public Protection and Sentencing 
It is common knowledge that a dangerous person’s imprisonment is partly for the protection of 
the public. In the UK, since the abolition of capital punishment, incapacitation of dangerous 
offenders – especially those with an extremely low chance of rehabilitation – has been utilised 
to contain offenders and therefore reduce crime. However, the Carter Report 2003, attributed 
only a 5% decrease in crime between 1997 and 2003 to higher custodial rates.30 This suggests 
that although it is important to protect society from dangerous criminals, incapacitation alone 
                                                     
24 ibid [H3] 
25 Criminal Justice Act 2003 S 224A(1)(b) 
26 McNee, (n 22) [H4] 
27 Bentham, (n 18) 
28 ibid [20] 
29 ibid [25] 
30 Susan Easton and Christine Piper, Sentencing and punishment: the quest for justice, vol 3 (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 137 
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is not enough to prevent crime. The law attempts to use punishment as a deterrent to prevent 
others from committing crime however it clearly does not deter as many as it should.  
Protection of the public is a major aim of punishment in regard to conspiracy, especially 
conspiracy to murder. The agreement to commit a crime suggests punishment would be used 
to prevent the crime agreed upon from occurring. It is necessary to point out that unlike murder, 
the mens rea for conspiracy to murder must include an intention to murder – not malice 
aforethought. This provides an explanation as to why there is such strict sentencing for 
conspiracy to murder as it is to punish the guilty mind not just a guilty act. 
Barot31 brought sentencing into the spotlight regarding conspiracy to murder offences. He 
planned a range of terror attacks on both the UK and USA, His intent was to re-enact 9/11 
which was a terrorist attack which resulted in 2,996 lives lost which “horrified and angered the 
nation.”32 Terrorism is arguably one of the gravest crimes in the UK and it is a crime that the 
public need protecting from the most. Reforming the law on conspiracy to murder is imperative 
to prevent terrorist attacks.  
Initially, Barot was sentenced to life imprisonment, with a recommendation to serve at least 40 
years. However, was lowered to a minimum of 30 years in 2007. Lord Phillips said Barot’s 
plans did not amount to an actual attempt, and it was not clear if these plans would succeed.33 
This decision may have been fair on Barot’s behalf but could outrage the public. Due to the 
court not understanding societies need to be protected from such crimes. This is where there is 
a struggle to balance the rights of the defendant against protection of the public – an aspect 
which must be strongly considered when reforming the law on conspiracy to murder. 
Co-conspirators and Sentencing 
                                                     
31 R v Dihren Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119 
32 Charles Lane, 'We Expected The War On Terror To Unite Us. What Went Wrong?' (Washington Post, 2018) 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-expected-the-war-on-terror-to-unite-us-what-went-
wrong/2018/09/10/5fb58c38-b4ff-11e8-a7b5-
adaaa5b2a57f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5fba7de06623> accessed 23 November 2018. 
33 ‘Dirty bomb man’s sentence cut’ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6661371.stm> accessed 17th November 2018 
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When a conspiracy case involves more than one conspirator, it can be unfair that they all 
receive the same sentence when ultimately there is always one more guilty than another. This 
can be seen in Khalil34. Co-conspirators are given strict sentences to act as a deterrent to others 
and to protect the public from organised crimes like in Barot.35 The case of Wyllie and 
Bolland36 gives an example of co-conspirators being sentenced unfairly. Although Wyllie 
received a longer sentence than Bolland; Wyllie was the main instigator and targeted Bolland 
to help him with his plot as he seemed vulnerable. Bolland still received 10 years imprisonment 
even though he was not the main party. Nevertheless, the court decided that it was important 
for both boys to receive a large sentence as their plot was so evil that they needed punishing 
and rehabilitating as they posed a threat to society.  
Their case reflected on the 1999 Columbine school massacre where two boys of similar age 
killed thirteen staff and teachers and intended to kill more. It was clear to the court that the way 
in which the boys “hero worshipped”37 this case made them dangerous and the plot needed to 
be prevented. Arnheim criticises the sentence as “unduly harsh” suggesting that the lack of 
access to firearms or explosives to carry out the plan meant arguably there was no conspiracy. 
But, in the eyes of the jury “it was a real plot”38 and they fully intended to carry the plan out. 
This can seem harsh, however unlike American law, the English law does not require an overt 
act for there to be a conspiracy. 
Wyllie and Bolland can also be compared to the largely publicised case of Venables and 
Thompson39 where two 10 year old boys brutally murdered a 2 year old. The defendants were 
murderers yet had to serve the same 10 year sentence as Wyllie and Bolland. Although this is 
not an exact comparison as Venables and Thompson were younger, it still shows how harsh 
the sentencing is against conspiracy to murder for youths. It is clear from this case and many 
                                                     
34 See page 10 lines 8-21 
See also R v Khalil and Others [2003] EWCA Crim 3467 
35 See page 7 lines 7-26 
See also R v Dihren Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119 
36 Judiciary of England and Wales, Sentencing remarks of Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb DBE (2018) 
<https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/r-v-wylie-and-bolland-sentencing.pdf> accessed 15 
November 2018 
37 ibid para 1 
38 ibid para 5 
39 'House Of Lords - Reg. V. Secretary Of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte V. And Reg. V. Secretary 
Of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte T.' (Publications.parliament.uk, 2018) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd970612/vandt01.htm> accessed 23 November 2018. 
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others that the law on conspiracy to murder especially on sentencing for conspiracy to murder, 
needs reform. 
Recommendations and Reforms 
The Law Commission produced a report of recommendations on Conspiracy and Attempts40, 
in 2009. A consultation paper41 was published on the 10th October 2007 and a Draft Bill was 
published on the 10th of December 2009. The recommendations were triggered by a House of 
Lords decision in the case of criminal42 where the defendant could not be guilty of conspiracy 
as he only suspected the activity was criminal and the mens rea for conspiracy specifically 
requires intent to commit an offence. The injustice of this case made it clear the law on 
conspiracy was unfair and needed reform. Subsequently, the Law Commission reviewed and 
concluded the law to be defective. The consultation papers produced by the Law Commission 
outline that conspiracy to murder can be charged, whether the murder was successful or if the 
defendant had not yet attempted or successfully committed the murder. 
Some of the recommendations made consisted of clarification to the law in relation to the 
agreement between co-conspirators to conspire to an offence and commit the offence conspired 
upon. The term “agreement” has only been defined in common law and in reforming the law, 
it would be useful to provide an interpretation of the word “agreement”. Jarvis suggests that an 
agreement is where “the parties share the same design or purpose so it can be said they truly 
breathe together.”43 This includes the accepted interpretation established in Mehta44 and is a 
suggestion of the interpretation that should be included in reform. 
The law currently states that spouses will not be liable for conspiracy45. The exemption for 
spouses is said, by the Law Commission, to be an embarrassment to a civilised system of law 
and therefore, should be abolished as it is an anomaly that they were exempt in the first place46: 
                                                     
40 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2007) 
41 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 183, 2009) 
42 R v Saik (Abdulrahman) [2007] 2 WLR 993 
43 Paul Jarvis and Michael Bisgrove, 'The Use And Abuse Of Conspiracy' (2014) 4 Criminal Law Review 
44 See page 3 line 16 
See also R v Mehta (Subhash) [2012] EWCA Crim 2824 
45 Criminal Law Act 1977, s 2(2) 
46 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts, (Consultation Paper No 183, 2007) Paras 1.42-1.44 
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spouses can commit conspiracy the same as anyone else. It also means that if a couple are 
engaged but not married, they are liable which would clearly lead to an injustice as the nature 
of the relationship between spouses is the same as between betrothed couples. Therefore, 
exemption for spouses should be abolished in reforming the law. 
Currently, a co-conspirator will not be guilty of conspiracy if the other co-conspirator is the 
intended victim47, the Law Commission’s recommendation is that the co-conspirator only 
should still be liable48. This is a necessary reform to keep fairness in the law; one of the aims 
of the law of conspiracy is to punish the guilty mind. Therefore, in a case where a co-
conspirator is an intended victim, the mental element is no different than any other conspiracy. 
Therefore, should still be convicted in the same manner as well as providing protection for the 
victim.  
Also, recommending adding a defence of crime prevention to be consistent with other inchoate 
offences.49 This would mean that if a conspirator acted for the purpose of preventing crime or 
limit the occurrence of harm, they would have a full defence to conspiracy. This would be an 
effective recommendation especially in cases with undercover police officers, for example, 
who may conspire but in order to prevent crime from taking place. 
Arnheim suggests that the law on conspiracy to murder allows too many convictions as the 
term “agreement” is interpreted to widely and recommends that like American law, conspiracy 
should require an “overt act” to consolidate the agreement to conspire.50 This would simplify 
the law on conspiracy as it adds a clear actus reus element to the offence. However, this would 
make it harder to convict conspiracy offences and therefore contradicts the aim to have strict 
law on conspiracy to deter people from committing the offence. Also, adding this element 
would require an interpretation of what an “overt act” is, which would then complicate the law 
which it had intended to simplify. 
                                                     
47 ibid 
48 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Consultation Paper No 183, 2007) paras 1.49-1.50 
49 Serious Crime Act 2007, s 50 
50 Dr Michael Arnheim, ‘A conspiracy too far?’ (2018) 168 The New Law Journal 
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Conclusion 
Without question, it is evident that the current law on conspiracy to murder is not precise and 
in desperate need of reform. The current statutory law on conspiracy is too broad which has 
led to confusion and injustice. The fact that conspiracy to murder can be given the same 
sentence to murder is evidently harsh and unfair, however this may have been the aim of 
Parliament in order to deter those from conspiring to commit murder. In order to reform the 
law, there must be a counter-balance between the rights of the defendant and protecting society. 
Recommendations provided should be considered to make the law more effective and fair.  
Expanding the offence so that it must include an “overt act” would be fairer on the defendant 
as they would only be prosecuted if they had made an active act to conspire. There are also 
recommendations to abolish exemptions which would broaden who could be convicted. This 
would allow for more convictions and therefore allow better protection for society. In 
conclusion, the current law on conspiracy to commit murder is not always effective and fair 
which means reform is required.
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